WATER SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA by Anderson, Zach K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-06
WATER SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA
Anderson, Zach K.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62803
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








WATER SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT 
IN NIGERIA 
by 
Zach K. Anderson 
June 2019 
Thesis Advisor: Emily L. Meierding 
Second Reader: Rachel L. Sigman 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 June 2019  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
WATER SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA  
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Zach K. Anderson 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 While there has been an abundance of research into answering the question of whether water scarcity 
causes conflict, there has not been as much research done on the contribution of water scarcity into 
escalation of regional conflicts. Within Nigeria there are two examples of water scarcity and conflict 
occurring in close proximity: the Niger Delta, and a violent conflict over oil pollution, and the ongoing 
threat of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region, where water grows increasingly scarce. This study seeks to 
find how water scarcity in these two regions may be influencing armed conflict. To answer this question, a 
process-tracing method is adopted to better parse out each step along the path from scarcity to conflict. The 
major finding is that water scarcity works as an amplifier to conflict, especially when livelihoods are 
disrupted and when the government fails to take appropriate action. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Nigeria, water scarcity, Niger Delta, Lake Chad  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 85 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
WATER SCARCITY AND VIOLENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA 
Zach K. Anderson 
Ensign, United States Navy 
BS, U.S. Naval Academy, 2018 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2019 
Approved by: Emily L. Meierding 
 Advisor 
 Rachel L. Sigman 
 Second Reader 
 Afshon P. Ostovar 
 Associate Chair for Research 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 While there has been an abundance of research into answering the question of 
whether water scarcity causes conflict, there has not been as much research done on the 
contribution of water scarcity into escalation of regional conflicts. Within Nigeria there 
are two examples of water scarcity and conflict occurring in close proximity: the Niger 
Delta, and a violent conflict over oil pollution, and the ongoing threat of Boko Haram in 
the Lake Chad region, where water grows increasingly scarce. This study seeks to find 
how water scarcity in these two regions may be influencing armed conflict. To answer 
this question, a process-tracing method is adopted to better parse out each step along the 
path from scarcity to conflict. The major finding is that water scarcity works as an 
amplifier to conflict, especially when livelihoods are disrupted and when the government 
fails to take appropriate action. 
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Water is one of the world’s most precious resources, and it is becoming increasingly 
scarce in many places around the globe. One country in particular facing water scarcity is 
Nigeria. In the Nigerian portion of the African Sahel, local populations struggle to find 
adequate clean drinking water. According to a Brookings Institution Report, Lake Chad 
has shrunk by nearly 90% since its most recent highpoint in the 1960s.1 Concomitantly, 
Nigeria has seen a rise in violence between groups of pastoral farmers as well as increased 
insurgent activity from Boko Haram. Furthermore, insurgent groups in the Niger Delta are 
engaged in activities to undermine the oil industry that has polluted the environment there 
with impunity for decades.  
The research question motivating this thesis is: how has water scarcity contributed 
to violence in Nigeria? There are some environmental security researchers who state that 
water scarcity may lead directly to conflict. In reality, the role that water scarcity plays in 
rates of armed conflict is more nuanced. Conflict does not always occur where water 
scarcity exists. However, in Nigeria, there are several cases in which water scarcity and 
conflict are occurring in tandem.  
The remainder of this chapter begins by discussing the significance of the research 
and why we should care about water conflict in Nigeria. Following this, there will be a 
review of the existing literature from which the most promising hypotheses are drawn out 
along with some preliminary supporting evidence. The last two sections are a description 
of the research design and finally an outline of the thesis itself.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
A recent report by the International Panel of Climate Change claimed that humanity 
is projected to only have twelve years to become carbon neutral to avoid dire temperature 
                                                 
1 Mariama Sow, “Figure of the Week: The Shrinking Lake Chad,” Brookings (blog), February 9, 2017, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/02/09/figure-of-the-week-the-shrinking-lake-chad/. 
2 
rise.2 Barring a significant innovation, there is a very good chance our species will not 
meet that mark. Along with higher temperatures, the Sahel and many other parts of the 
globe are expected to experience increased drought severity and subsequent water scarcity 
issues. This topic has important policy relevance as it will serve as a point of reference for 
mitigation and adaptation initiatives in a future of more acute droughts. Understanding the 
links between climate change and conflict can provide guidance about the most pressing 
actions that should be taken. The challenges facing Nigeria therefore exist as a sample for 
other developing countries globally.  
Environmentally, Nigeria has water scarcity and pollution issues that are likely to 
affect its population. Climate scientists predict that rising temperatures and increasing CO2 
concentrations will impact late developers in Africa and Asia the worst.3 Environmental 
security researchers have long debated whether a scarcity issue can be enough to spark 
conflict. Finding the answer to when scarcity may lead to conflict will become more 
important as the climate continues to change, and droughts increase. Through the study of 
Nigeria, one may more closely pinpoint what happens when there is an acute water scarcity 
in a region which also struggles to adapt.  
In many regions in Nigeria water scarcity and conflict coexist. Two such regions 
are Lake Chad and the Niger Delta. These two regions represent two prominent versions 
of the scarcity discussion: desertification in Lake Chad and degradation through pollution 
in the Delta. Armed conflict in the Delta threatens the energy security of the country and 
the global energy market more broadly, due to the size of the Nigerian oil industry. The 
importance of studying Nigerian water pollution due to oil and the link to conflict is 
important in the context of current events. New oil discoveries have created oil markets in 
countries such as Ghana. Should oil pollution, water, and conflict be intertwined, the 
international community would be wise to take lessons learned from the Nigerian example 
and apply it to new oil producers.  
                                                 
2 “Global Warming of 1.5 oC —,” accessed December 4, 2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 
3 “Study: Global Warming Hits Poorest Nations Hardest,” Eos, accessed March 29, 2019, 
https://eos.org/scientific-press/study-global-warming-hits-poorest-nations-hardest. 
3 
The lasting security of Nigeria is also of strategic importance to the United States. 
First, Nigeria is the world’s fourth largest democracy and a regional partner to the U.S. in 
Africa, particularly in the fight against terrorism in the region. The United States has a long 
history of protecting current democracies and promoting democratic institutions abroad. 
For example, Pillar IV of the most recent National Security Strategy is titled “Advance 
American Influence.” Under this pillar the NSS lays out what the White House views as 
the American role in the world.4 A large part of this role is strengthening global partners 
and the protection of civil liberties, outlined in the Bill of Rights. Due to the fact that 
Nigeria is a democracy, energy trading partner with the United States, and a regional 
influencer in Northwest Africa, its advancement and prosperity should be a key part of 
United States foreign policy. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The idea that water scarcity can lead to armed conflict has been widely studied and 
contested. Logically, it makes sense that, because water is necessary for life, its waning 
abundance might cause increased rates of armed violence. The causal chain is simple; when 
there is not enough water to go around, people will fight for control of the resource. In spite 
of this apparent simplicity, the question of when water scarcity leads to conflict is more 
complex: requiring that culture, economics, and adaptive capacity be taken into 
consideration. The literature on this topic is broad and diverse, but for the sake of this 
review has been divided into four main groups. These are four major ways in which water 
scarcity in Nigeria might lead to armed conflict. The four groups are, first, that scarcity is 
a direct cause of conflict; second, conflict emerges from a lack of state capacity to deal 
with the scarcity; third, scarcity induces migration, which then acts as a destabilizing factor; 
fourth, water scarcity negatively impacts livelihoods in ways that make conflict more 
likely. 
                                                 
4 2016 United States NSS, www. WhiteHouse.gov. 
4 
1. Water Scarcity As a Direct Cause of Conflict  
Most controversially, there have been some environmental security researchers 
who posit that resource scarcity itself is enough to spark a conflict. In “The Coming 
Anarchy,” Kaplan paints a future of increasing environmental degradation and rising rates 
of conflict. His perceived future is one where “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, 
scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and 
international borders, and the empowerment of private armies” run rampant. Kaplan’s 
argument is clear; as population rises and humans pollute and overconsume, there will 
come a time when resources have run dry and then conflict and anarchy will become more 
common. 
This was also an argument made by Homer-Dixon, an early proponent of the neo-
Malthusian argument for scarcity conflict. One of the author’s key theses is that, due to 
environmental changes in the near future, there will be “simple scarcity” conflicts over 
limited resources. According to Homer-Dixon, there are three causes that play into a 
resource scarcity. First, due to human activity, the amounts of renewable resources are 
declining. Second, maldistribution of existing resources results in some people getting 
more resources than others. Third, rising demand as a result of population growth and 
regional norms strain existing resources. For example, the norms of a country or region 
dictate the amount of resource consumption appropriate. A resource rich area would be 
more comfortable wasting a resource because there is no sense of a scarcity.5 
Resource scarcity then leads to violence through ethnic marginalization and 
resource capture.6 Ethnic marginalization refers to a situation in which a negative 
environmental situation disproportionately impacts some disadvantaged group. Resource 
capture refers to the acts by a country’s elites to control resources. Poor resource 
management combines with population growth and resource capture, resulting in 
ecological marginalization, which may lead to violence. 
                                                 
5 THD, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases • Thomas Homer-
Dixon,” Thomas Homer-Dixon (blog), June 1, 1991, https://homerdixon.com/evidence-from-cases-full-
article/. 
6 THD, 12. 
5 
Homer-Dixon uses ethnic violence in Mauritania in 1989 as evidence for this 
theory. Poor environmental conditions reduced crop yields in the region. When the 
Senegalese River was dammed to produce electricity and control agriculture, it increased 
the price of the land. Mauritania’s elites rewrote the law so that they could seize this land 
and prevent the local black population from using that land. This prompted an outbreak in 
ethnic violence between the white Moors and black Mauritanians.7 
Ohlsson differentiates between first and second order scarcities, depicting the latter 
as “turning of the screw.” A second order scarcity is what he calls a “social resource 
scarcity.”8 A social resource scarcity occurs when institutions are unable to adapt by 
increasing the amount of resource available or improving efficiency of resource use. In the 
context of Homer-Dixon’s case study, Mauritania suffered from the effects of both a first 
and second order scarcity. The first order scarcity simply refers to there not being enough 
water. The second order scarcity refers to government mismanagement, which made the 
water situation worse.  
Some of the claims made by Neo-Malthusians have been criticized for their lack of 
empirical rigor. Gleditsch makes the point that much of the environmental conflict 
argument is future-based. He takes issue with the fact that institutions and mitigation efforts 
are largely ignored. For example, Kaplan invokes West Africa as a model for the future 
world as a whole, while ignoring the fact that some countries are more suited to adapt and 
confront environmental challenges than others.9  
A second criticism is that there has not been enough research into how scarcity is a 
driver of conflict. While a lot has been written regarding associations between these two 
variables, there is generally a lack of research into why these two are related. Baalen and 
Mobjork contend that quantitative research is limited in its depth of analysis while 
                                                 
7 THD, 12,13. 
8 Ohlsson, “Water Conflicts and Social Resource Scarcity.” Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Part 
B: Hydrology, Oceans, and Atmosphere, Volume 25, Issue 3 (28 April, 2000): 213-220. 
9 Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Climate Change and Conflict,” Political Geography, 
Climate Change and Conflict, 26, no. 6 (August 1, 2007): 627–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003. 
6 
qualitative research would provide a better idea of the mechanisms driving scarcity and 
conflict.10 An earlier work from Meierding states that, while the science of climate 
research has advanced, theory has lagged behind. She states that in order to better keep up, 
the importance of local institutions must also be taken into account.11 
Bernauer et al. offer an alternative perspective. They argue that resource scarcity 
could inspire cooperation, rather than conflict. Two of their key findings are that, of all the 
water related events, there were slightly more instances of cooperative actions than 
conflictual events. Second, they found that non-democratic regimes were more likely than 
democratic regimes to engage in intrastate water cooperation.12 These findings lend 
support to the perspective that resource scarcity, alone, does not cause conflict.  
2. Water Scarcity and State Institutions  
Within the institutional literature, there are two ways that a state’s actions relate to 
conflict. First, water scarcity leads to poor water management which further stresses 
resources. While Ohlsson is a proponent of the direct resource conflict hypothesis, he 
acknowledges that renewable resource scarcities are made worse by the lack of institutions 
to mitigate drought.13 Gupta et al. argue that a state with greater institutional capacity is 
more likely to adapt to climate change. The authors’ measure adaptive capacity using six 
identifying characteristics. These characteristics are variety, learning capacity, space for 
planned and innovative autonomous action, leadership, availability of resources, and fair 
                                                 
10 Sebastian van Baalen and Malin Mobjörk, “Climate Change and Violent Conflict in East Africa: 
Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research to Probe the Mechanisms,” International Studies Review, 
accessed December 4, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix043..  
11 Emily Meierding, “Climate Change and Conflict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather,” 
International Studies Review 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 185–203, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12030. 
12 Tobias Böhmelt et al., “Demand, Supply, and Restraint: Determinants of Domestic Water Conflict 
and Cooperation,” Global Environmental Change 29 (November 1, 2014): 337–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.018. 
13 Ohlsson,  215. 
7 
governance.14 States which measure poorly on these characteristics, such as many in 
Africa, are more likely to struggle to adapt to climate change. 
In the context of the Syrian Civil War, de Châtel argues strongly that poor land 
management policies cause conflict, as opposed to water scarcity itself. The author makes 
the points that, first, drought is a natural part of the Syrian climate. Second, had it not been 
for government funded agricultural projects which strained groundwater reserves, scarcity 
would not have displaced as many Syrians as it did.15 In the author’s words “The extent to 
which climate change exacerbated the situation is debatable, but in any case should not 
reduce the burden of responsibility on the Syrian government.”16 Essentially, it is the 
government’s responsibility to manage demand. The state is able to accomplish this by 
providing more resources or using resources more efficiently .  
The second way institutions may precipitate conflict from water scarcity is a lack 
of conflict management capacity. Gizelis and Wooden write that conflict over scarcity 
almost exclusively applies to non-democracies. It is not the scarcity that drives conflict per 
se, but the lack of a channel for people to express their discontent. According to their 
research, democratic institutions help mitigate scarcity conflict because they provide 
citizens with a clear avenue to express their grievances. They write that “conflicts are often 
driven by social tensions that primarily reflect institutional failures and mismanagement at 
the local and community level.”17 Due to the fact that a democracy is responsive to its 
constituents, this fosters a stronger state-society relationship which is vital for conflict 
mitigation. The authors use the Colorado River as a case study for the role institutions play 
                                                 
14 J. Gupta et al., “Institutions for Climate Change : A Method to Assess the Inherent Characteristics of 
Institutions to Enable the Adaptive Capacity of Society” (Amsterdam: IVM : Institute for Environmental 
Studies Vrije Universiteit, 2008), https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/422079. 
15 “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the 
Revolution: Middle Eastern Studies: Vol 50, No 4,” accessed December 5, 2018, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263206.2013.850076. 
16 “The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers of the 
Revolution: Middle Eastern Studies: Vol 50, No 4.”. 
17 Oslo (PRIO). 
8 
in mitigating conflict. Violence over the declining waters of the Colorado River has been 
avoided due to the well-established litigation and mediation of different state’s interests.18  
The literature shows that the existence of strong democratic institutions is a key 
factor in avoiding violence over resource scarcity. Most water conflicts have their roots in 
the demand side, rather than the supply side, in the form of worsening drought 
conditions.19 Demand side pressure refers to strain caused by excess human consumption. 
One example of a demand side stressor is water loss as a result of irrigation. This is in 
contrast to supply side stressors which include rainfall and temperature. The two key ways 
in which institutions help mitigate water scarcity violence are through mitigation efforts 
themselves, whether that be promoting efficiency or finding ways to gain access to more 
water. The second way is by giving citizens who are experiencing a resource scarcity an 
avenue to air their grievances, promoting a non-violent way to express frustration.20 
3. Water Scarcity and Migration  
Some authors contend that the root of scarcity conflict comes from the effects on 
migration. Reuveny makes the point that, when individuals are confronted with severe 
environmental degradation, they can attempt to mitigate the effects, do nothing and accept 
the consequences, or leave the area.21 The author’s rationale for scarcity driving migration 
is built on the assumption that people will make the decision to migrate when the 
opportunities in the new area offset the cost of migration.22 Water scarcity induces 
migration because it increases the cost of staying, thus lowering the opportunity cost of 
leaving.  
                                                 
18Oslo (PRIO). 
19 Böhmelt et al., “Demand, Supply, and Restraint,” 340. 
20 Böhmelt et al., 345. 
21 Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography, 
Climate Change and Conflict, 26, no. 6 (August 1, 2007): 656–73, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001. 
22 Reuveny, 659. 
9 
Reuveny states that migration leads to conflict through four major pathways. These 
include competition, ethnic tension, distrust, and fault lines.23 Competition refers to an 
influx of migrants stressing the existing pool of resources in the receiving area. Distrust 
and ethnic tension often work in tandem, when migrants may be coming from a group or 
tribe that has historically poor relations with an ethnic group in the receiving country or 
region. This can breed distrust between the migrants and individuals in the receiving area. 
Finally, when migration reinforces fault lines between different socioeconomic groups it 
may also cause conflict. An example of this would be a migration from rural to urban areas 
that highlights the differences between farmers and industrial workers.24 
The argument that migration causes conflict received a boost with the 2011 Syrian 
Civil War. A study by Kelley et al. cites severe drought and subsequent migration from 
rural areas to urban centers as a destabilizing catalyst. Overcrowding and 
underemployment in Syria’s major cities created an environment where grievances were 
not addressed and an uprising was more easily coordinated.25 This is similar to the 
argument espoused by Gleick, in a 2014 article where he states that drought “contributed 
to the displacement of large populations from rural to urban centers, food insecurity for 
more than a million people, and increased unemployment.”26  
One other reason for migration causing conflict is that “groups from different areas 
and of differing ethnicity are more likely to lack shared institutions for conflict 
resolution.”27 Migration may cause conflict simply because two groups have set norms for 
how to deal with problems and are not accustomed to cooperating by any other means. 
                                                 
23 Reuveny, 659. 
24 Reuveny, 659. 
25 Colin P. Kelley et al., “Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian 
Drought,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112, no. 11 (March 17, 2015): 3241–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1421533112.. 
26 Peter H. Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,” Weather, Climate, and 
Society 6, no. 3 (March 3, 2014): 331–40, https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1. 
27 Val Baalen and Mobjork, 2016. 
10 
Selby and Hoffman use the case studies of Cyprus and Israel as evidence for their 
argument that migration functions both as a cause and effect of environmental degradation. 
Their two key findings are that, first, the possibility for migration to cause conflict differs 
greatly between countries; and second, that those with greater adaptive capacities are much 
less likely to experience conflict as a result.28 They also find evidence that conflict can 
cause migration, which then degrades the environment.29 
There has also been some research finding that scarcity causes migration due to the 
negative effects on livelihoods.30 Reuveny has shown that migrations in Syria and Eastern 
Africa were precipitated by the negative effects of scarcity on livelihoods. The next section 
will explore this concept further. 
4. Water Scarcity and Negative Impact on Livelihoods 
In their 1995 work, Collier and Hoeffler argue that civil war can be predicted by 
quantifying the potential losses and gains of engaging in a rebellion. They conclude that 
African states are especially susceptible to civil war because of their low per capita income, 
moderate resource wealth, and increasing population. The reason for this is that when there 
is a low per capita income in a society there are not sufficient opportunity costs for rebelling 
to dissuade individuals from trying to overthrow the state. On the other side of the equation, 
when the state has some degree of resource wealth, but not enough to strengthen its capacity 
to put down a rebellion, the potential gains of civil war are high.  
This is especially true for areas in which livelihood security is tied to climate 
sensitive occupations. This is the case in many African countries, including Nigeria, where 
the agricultural industry makes up a large part of the GDP. Ohlsson expands on the 
opportunity cost argument put forward by Collier and Hoeffler by arguing that rapid 
changes in livelihoods, rather than persistent and endemic poverty, are the cause of 
                                                 
28 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, “Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Migration: A Comparative 
Analysis and Reappraisal,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 30, no. 6 (December 1, 
2012): 997–1014, https://doi.org/10.1068/c11335j. 
29 Selby and Hoffmann, 1000. 
30 Reuveny, 670. 
11 
conflict.31 Ohlsson goes on to state that, because agriculture makes up a large portion of 
economies in developing nations, water scarcity likely plays a large role in livelihood 
conflict. According to Ohlsson, a common feature of “the most atrocious militias” is that 
their numbers largely consist of young men “who have been subjected to a rapid 
devaluation of their expectations as a result of loss of family livelihoods, and forced to 
accept a much worse situation in society.”32 Tying this back to Collier and Hoeffler, the 
loss of livelihoods, particularly in agriculture, means that large populations of young men 
have more to gain from joining an insurgency than they have to lose. This in turn would 
increase the chances that they engage in armed violence.  
Ohlsson expanded on his previous work at the Hague Conference on Environment, 
Security, and Sustainable Development in 2004. The author stated that, in addition to the 
loss of livelihoods, there is a coincident rise in frustrations due to unmet expectations by 
young men regarding the land they are entitled to. In a culture in which land inheritance is 
a key part of social identity, there are more grievances by indigenes. As climate uncertainty 
causes more drought, previously fertile land lays fallow and uninheritable. Ohlsson 
describes this situation, stating, “As young men in rural areas find themselves 
disinherited…they have lost any chance of gaining the attributes of a real man.”33  
This brings up a tension within the livelihood debate of whether it is the loss of economic 
opportunity itself or grievances which go unanswered by the government that lead 
to conflict. 
From a water scarcity perspective, Barnett and Adger make the argument that 
resource conflict does not occur in a vacuum. It is the consequential social changes that 
lead to armed conflict. One of the proposed causal mechanisms is the impact on the 
economy in resource dependent sectors. They state: “a common factor in many internal 
wars is that armed groups are comprised of young men whose expectations for a better life 
                                                 
31 Ohlsson, 2. 
32 Ohlsson, 2. 
33 “Livelihood Conflicts: Linking Poverty and Environment as Causes of Conflict, Leif Ohlsson, 




have been frustrated due to contractions in their livelihoods. This makes joining a group 
relatively more rational option to achieve some status in society.”34 Water scarcity makes 
it more difficult to make a living through traditional means. In cultures where social status 
is tied to land, this may be particularly destabilizing.35 
Additionally, research on pastoralists in Kenya provides some evidence of the 
livelihood explanation happening in real time. Baalen and Mobjork found “worsening 
livelihood conditions primarily increase the risk of less organized forms of violent conflict, 
such as livestock raiding and communal conflict.”36 Traditionally, communal conflict has 
always been more likely in Kenyan drylands and in areas with a history of competing 
interests surrounding water. In this example, water scarcity is exacerbating a history of 
violence due to its effects on livelihoods.  
Meierding’s 2013 paper also stresses the importance of uncertainty and insecurity 
in the lives of individuals in water-dependent industries. The inability to predict whether 
yields will be enough to sustain oneself and lack of faith that the state would be able to 
withstand an exogenous climate shock leads to insecurity.37  
To summarize, the literature has identified four pathways for water scarcity causing 
conflict. These are simple scarcity, weak institutions, migration, and the negative impact 
on livelihoods. There are some areas where the literature overlaps. For example, migration 
is destabilizing, especially when there are not sufficient institutions to absorb displaced 
individuals. Additionally, the loss of livelihoods may induce migration, as individuals can 
no longer rely on traditional sources of income to support themselves. This then 
incentivizes further migration, which stresses a receiving state. The next section applies 
the core ideas from existing literature to specific cases in Nigeria. 
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C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Building off existing theories in the literature, there are a number of ways in 
which water scarcity could be causing conflict in Nigeria. I have identified four specific 
hypotheses which come from the four main bodies of literature explored in the previous 
section. 
The first hypothesis is that there is direct scarcity conflict over water in Nigeria. 
The causal explanation for this scenario is that the root cause of armed conflict is declining 
water availability. Should  I observe examples of leaders within the Delta and Lake Chad 
Basin communities citing water scarcity as a reason for violence, this would lend support 
to the hypothesis. Additionally, if the hypothesis has validity, I would expect to observe an 
inverse relationship between water and conflict. As water availability decreased there 
would be an observable increase in conflict.  
The second hypothesis identified is that water scarcity causes violence when the 
state responds poorly via weak institutions. If this hypothesis is valid then there would be 
evidence of a viable institutional response to solve or improve water scarcity which the 
state could have adopted. Additionally, it would be clear that the state did not take 
appropriate action, which caused violence. In the Niger Delta, I would expect to see an 
ecosystem badly polluted by the oil industry. Then, evidence of government corruption and 
lax regulations which worsen the issue. There is also the possibility that this hypothesis 
does not go far enough in classifying the state’s role in causing conflict. An addition to the 
existing hypothesis is that it is the state’s actions themselves which cause conflict. Should 
this be the case, I expect to find evidence that the Nigerian government took deliberate 
action which increased violence. 
In the Lake Chad Basin, I expect to find that water mismanagement contributed to 
violence. While climate change is playing a role in desertification of the land surrounding 
Lake Chad, human actions such as inefficient damming and irrigation projects, heavy 
human use, and a focus on short term solutions have all contributed to water shortages.38 
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Should the institutional hypothesis prove correct for both regions, the natural 
environmental situation would have been made worse by the government’s water 
management policy. 
The third hypothesis is water scarcity leads to individuals migrating in search of 
more water, which then causes conflict. If there is violence between farmers and herders 
in the Lake Chad Basin, this would provide some evidence of the validity of the hypothesis. 
For example, as water has grown scarcer, so has the amount of farmable land available. 
This is further complicated by the existence of pastoral farming in which farmers are 
nomadic by nature. Consequently, as population increases and good grazing land is 
diminished, pastoralism would lend itself to migratory patterns which may cause 
conflict.39  If migration is causing conflict around Lake Chad, I expect to find that Boko 
Haram is able to exploit migration for recruiting purposes or as a means to inflict terror. 
One potential challenge to this hypothesis would be if the role of violence and migration is 
found to be the reverse. Furthermore, if there is a pre-existing culture of violence between 
farmers and pastoralists, then recent attacks would not prove the hypothesis. There is also 
the possibility that migration is a cause of conflict but comes later in the causal chain. If 
this were the case then improper agricultural practices and lack of governmental regulation 
would precede migration and there would likely be statements from pastoralists citing this 
as their reason for migrating. 
If migration is a cause of conflict in the Niger Delta, individuals would be migrating 
in response to heavy oil pollution. There would be evidence that as gas flaring and oil 
spillage continue to increase land degradation, local Nigerians are migrating to find 
employment and escape pollution. The literature from the previous section provides 
evidence to the destabilizing effect of migration, particularly in a country with weak 
institutions and adaptive capacity 
Going one step further, a key part of the migration hypothesis is that individuals 
are leaving because water scarcity has somehow impacted their livelihood. Additionally, 
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this hypothesis states that even in the absence of migration, livelihood degradation can still 
lead to conflict. The fourth hypothesis I will investigate is that water scarcity is having a 
negative impact on traditional livelihoods which causes violence. If this hypothesis proves 
correct, I expect to find evidence that  a primary cause of conflict are disruptions in the 
traditional livelihood structure. In both cases there would be examples of  pollution 
reducing local Nigerian’s ability to make a living from fishing and farming. If there is 
evidence that Boko Haram is using employment or financial incentives to recruit, this 
would increase the strength of the livelihood hypothesis. Furthermore, in the Niger Delta, 
there would be rhetorical examples from violent groups which cite economic grievances as 
a cause of conflict.  
From the existing literature, I have identified four ways in which water scarcity 
may be causing armed conflict in Nigeria. These hypotheses are direct conflict over 
water, water scarcity in addition to weak institutions causing conflict, scarcity induced 
migration leading to conflict, and finally that the negative effects on Nigerian livelihoods 
cause violence. This thesis will evaluate which, if any, of these pathways exist in two 
Nigerian cases. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
My research uses qualitative methods to examine two cases of water scarcity and 
violent conflict within Nigeria. These cases are armed conflict in the Niger Delta and the 
Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region. For each of the two case studies, I use a 
process tracing method in order to assess which pathways have contributed to violence.40 
After this, I synthesize what the main findings were, the similarities and differences 
between the two cases, and then provide some policy solutions and suggestions for future 
research.  
I use process tracing to evaluate my hypotheses for two reasons. The first reason is 
the nature of the question itself. My thesis focuses on answering the question, how does 
water scarcity cause violence? Process tracing is the best suited method to answer this 
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question, because it allows me to look at the events that occurred, for both cases, step by 
step and identify which pathways played the strongest role in precipitating conflict. This 
method yielded the best results when it came to identifying the causal mechanisms between 
water scarcity and conflict. The specific way in which water scarcity is inducing conflict 
was best isolated through this process tracing analysis. Process tracing also allowed for the 
isolation of causal mechanisms, while eliminating superfluous information.  
The second reason for this research design is because the roles water scarcity plays 
are likely to be more nuanced than a reduction in water leading directly to increased 
violence. Water depletion and degradation, migration, poor water management, and 
livelihood loss do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, each variable interacts with the others, 
creating unique environments which led to violent conflict. The qualitative approach used 
for this thesis allows me to derive conclusions about the importance and relationship of the 
variables vice simply finding correlations.  
There has been a lot of research into if water scarcity causes conflict, but not a lot 
of research into how it causes conflict. The two cases were chosen because they are 
examples of water scarcity and violent conflict occurring in tandem. This thesis examines 
how water scarcity may be driving conflict in Nigeria, building off previous research into 
potential causal mechanisms. The cases were analyzed from an institutions, migration, and 
livelihood aspect.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of the thesis will proceed as follows. There will be two chapters 
devoted to the two cases identified previously. The first chapter focuses on the situation in 
Lake Chad and how desertification of the lake may or may not be contributing to the Boko 
Haram insurgency. I also explore the socioeconomics of the insurgent group and how it 
recruits Nigerian youth to their cause. The second chapter is on the current situation in the 
Niger Delta. I will specifically look at the relationship between the oil companies, the state, 
and Delta State residents. I pay special attention to the evolution of protests in the region, 
and answer the question; why have protest movements become more violent since the 
17 
1990s? The thesis ends with a conclusion summarizing the findings of my research and 
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II. THE LAKE CHAD BASIN AND BOKO HARAM 
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Nigeria is in the midst of an environmental and humanitarian disaster. Lake Chad, 
a key supplier of water to bordering states, has receded substantially in the past fifty years. 
Since 1960, Lake Chad has shrunk by close to  90%. The lake acts as a key supplier of 
water to Nigeria and was once the largest reservoir in the Sahel covering 26,000 square 
kilometers.41 Climate change and increased demands for irrigation have hastened its 
retreat. Since the mid-2000s, the region harbors the extremist group Boko Haram. 
Terrorists in the region have been a persistent threat to civilians, undermining regional 
stability with frequent attacks. In this chapter, I find that water scarcity in the region 
contributes to Boko Haram’s influence by disrupting traditional livelihood structures, 
which, in turn, increases the number of potential recruits. Alarmingly, the CIA World 
Factbook states that the agricultural industry in Nigeria employs 70% of its population. 
However, droughts have consistently reduced annual crop yields. This is especially 
worrying as the economy in Northeastern Nigeria relies on Lake Chad for fishing and 
farming. The recession of Lake Chad is threatening traditional livelihood structures, which 
feeds the threat of Boko Haram, as the organization has had continued success when 
targeting impoverished Nigerian youth. The evidence from the Lake Chad Basin, with 
disrupted livelihood structures and insufficient or improper government action, lends 
support to the third and fourth hypotheses.  
The remainder of this chapter begins with an overview of the ecology and 
bathymetry of Lake Chad in the context of climate change. This overview will also include 
potential solutions to persistent drought. It will be followed by a brief history of Boko 
Haram and an overview of the conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. I will then explore the 
socio-economic conditions of the region itself, how traditional livelihoods are being 
disrupted, and the role disrupted livelihoods play in fostering violent extremism. The 
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chapter concludes with a discussion about the role [s] water played—and did not play—in 
the Boko Haram insurgency. 
B. LAKE CHAD AND REGIONAL WATER SECURITY 
Lake Chad is notable for its importance to shoreline communities and susceptibility 
to climate fluctuations. At its peak, Lake Chad had a surface area of 25,000 square 
kilometers. However, that area had shrunk to only about 1500 square kilometers by 2010.42 
Historically, the lake acted as a key supplier of fresh water to its bordering countries, which 
include Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad. As the primary supplier of  fresh water in the 
region, the lake is vital to the Sahelian economy. Fertile land on the lake’s shores supports 
agriculture, crop production, livestock grazing, and fisheries.43 The combined shallow 
depth and dependence on rain to maintain its water levels means it is highly susceptible to 
drought. This was apparent during periods in the 1970s when the Northern basin was left 
completely dry.44  
The Chari river from the south and the Komodugu-Yobe river from the northwest 
are largely responsible for controlling lake levels.45 Rainfall can also reach the lake 
through tributaries and groundwater discharge.46 Heavy rains from the African monsoon 
season replenish the lake’s water levels after an intense period of drought. The short rainy 
season usually begins in July and lasts through September, while the dry season is most 
intense from November through March.47 Lake Chad has experienced cycles of drought 
for thousands of years and dramatic recessions are nothing new, as evidenced by French 
explorer Jean Tilho reporting a dry Northern basin in 1910.48  What has been significant 
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is the switch from balanced drought and monsoon seasons to persistent dryness. With 
improvements in climatological research methods, scientists have been able to record a 
shift from complete drought recovery during rainier seasons, to a continued decline in lake 
levels. Research done by Churchill Okonkwo shows that this shift began in the 1970s and 
has persisted through to the present. According to him, climatic conditions have shifted, 
such that the drier spells due to the Atlantic Multi-decadal Oscillation (AMO) are now 
overriding the wetter conditions of La Niña, beginning in the 1980s.49  Data since the 
1900s have shown that lake levels mirror the fluctuations in rainfall; however the period 
between the 1960s and 1980s saw levels plunge three meters below the 100 year mean. 
What this means is that while Lake Chad has experienced periods of drought for thousands 
of years, the change in recent years has been the trend of drier seasons overriding wetter 
conditions. 
Studies have revealed three reasons for Lake Chad’s recession. First, the lake’s 
unique bathymetry, which lends itself to splitting into two lakes, makes it more vulnerable 
to water loss. Second, water use for irrigation has increased since the 1970s, which has 
prevented recovery of lake levels even during wetter seasons. Third, climate change has 
reduced average annual rainfall amounts from 1960 to the present, thereby reducing 
inflow.50 As Gao explains “Failure of the lake to merge back into a single lake following 
wetter conditions in the 1990s is a result of irrigation withdrawals--without irrigation, the 
lake would have merged in 1999, although it would have split again in 2004.”51 This study 
shows that the issue is multifaceted and reasons for its reduced levels are due to human, 
geological, and climatological factors. 
In their study, Coe and Foley find that, since the 1970s, Lake Chad’s shrinkage can 
be explained in equal parts due to local human behavior and climate change.52 
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Additionally, they found increased irrigation losses to climate change as well, because as 
the number of rainfall events decreases, more water is required for agriculture from the 
lake.53 Therefore, immediate man-made causes are responsible for 50% of the loss.54 
Moreover, climate change impacts the lake for its primary and secondary effects on 
human behavior. 
C. MITIGATING LAKE RECESSION 
The multifaceted causes of Lake Chad’s recession require comprehensive 
mitigation and adaptation efforts. A variety of solutions have been proposed and range 
from redirecting  entire rivers to educating communities in smarter irrigation methods.  
Efforts to save Lake Chad range from the mundane to the more extreme. In 2015, 
the Lake Chad Basin Commission convened and agreed upon commitments to empower 
local communities to build resilience to climate change with a specific focus on 
livelihoods.55 Similar themes were noted in a 2017 meeting in Oslo on the same subject, 
in which a three-pronged approach was identified to include an estimated $1.6 billion to be 
directed towards a humanitarian response, stabilization with regards to the Boko Haram 
insurgency, and once again building community resilience.56  
Of the more extreme variety, there has been limited talk regarding the idea of 
diverting water from the Congo River towards refilling Lake Chad. Originally constructed 
by Italian engineers in the 1980s, Transaqua was and is, as Gao et al. describe “a plan to 
construct a 2400 km canal to transfer water from upstream tributaries of the mighty Congo 
River all the way to the Chari River Basin, which feeds Lake Chad.”57 However, the sheer 
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size of the project and the unknown environmental consequences of diverting the Congo 
River have left Transaqua to only exist in the minds of hopeful African engineers. 
Building off of Gao et al.’s study into the unique bathymetry of Lake Chad, there 
are structural changes which would improve and reduce the tendency of the lake to split. 
One important feature of Lake Chad is a shallow ridge roughly 40km wide which dissects 
the Northern and Southern portions.58 When the water level is at or above the barrier the 
two portions merge into one lake. When this occurs, referred to as a “Big Lake Chad”  there 
is less water loss due to evaporation and subsequently a reduced susceptibility to drought. 
Additionally, the Northern portions is dependent on inflow from rivers which feed the 
southern portion to maintain its levels. Thus, when the lake is split, the north can dry out 
rapidly. This was the case when the northern portion was completely dry in 1986.59 One 
solution to the recession problem would be to breach the barrier rather than build a canal. 
In their study, Gao et al. were able to show “breaching the barrier could help reduce the 
amount of water transfer required to restore the lake; modeling results suggests that it 
would take one year less when using the 50 cubic kilometers per year inflow scenario.”60 
A physical solution to the problem would be to breach the natural barrier within the Lake 
itself. This would be more cost effective and require fewer resources than diverting a river 
by building a canal. While there has been limited discussion of breaching the barrier in the 
past, it is possible that this solution would become more viable should ecological 
conditions worsen. Due to the fact that these issues are difficult to correct, scarcity in the 
region is likely to remain stubbornly persistent for years to come.  
D. OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT 
Understanding Lake Chad’s role in Boko Haram’s present activities requires a 
deeper understanding of the terrorist group itself. Nigeria has a history of resistance to 
Western influence dating back to the British seizing control of the Sokoto Caliphate in 
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1903.61 Boko Haram, as we now know it, was officially founded in 2002 by Mohammed 
Yusuf; however the group’s existence goes back to 1995 when an Orthodox Islamic sect 
of theology was formed at the University of Maiduigiri by Ababakar Lawan.62 This sect 
remained non-violent until 2002 when Lawan left the University to study in Saudi Arabia 
and leadership was assumed by Mohammed Yusuf.63 Yusuf subsequently changed the 
focus of the group from education to jihad.64 After Yusuf took control, the group 
maintained a relatively low profile, dissociating themselves from society as a way to further 
indoctrinate their members.65 However, the group’s existence hit mainstream attention in 
2009, when their actions included a major anti-government revolt in Nigeria. Notably, the 
revolt involved attacks on schools, government buildings, and police stations.66 Yusuf was 
ultimately captured and killed by Nigerian forces after the skirmish had ended; however, 
his death made him a martyr. Videos of his death are still used as motivation for current 
members.67 Since the 2009 revolt, there have been several high-profile attacks carried out 
by the group. In 2011 the group expanded the sphere of targets from local government 
buildings to a United Nations building.68  
The United Nations refugee agency estimates that, since 2011, the conflict has been 
responsible for putting seven million people at risk of starvation and displacing another 2.4 
million.69 In that same seven-year span, a Council on Foreign Relations report recorded 
2,021 violent incidents involving Boko Haram with 37,530 people killed.70 Civilians have 
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borne the greatest proportion of violent conflict related deaths with 45% or roughly 15,107 
total Boko Haram related casualties.71 Arguably the most jarring activity involved the 
kidnap of 276 schoolgirls in April of 2014 in Borno State, Nigeria.72 It is estimated that 
the group itself has between 7,000 and 10,000 militants.73 Militant activity peaked in 2014 
and 2015, though the insurgency has since lost a substantial amount of territory due to a 
successful military campaign by the Nigerian government. Geographically, Boko Haram 
mainly operates in northeastern Nigeria around Lake Chad.74 Figure 1 puts the geographic 
concentration of attacks in context. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Nigeria showing Boko Haram attacks. Source:75 
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Recently, the group’s tactics have shifted from popular insurrection against the 
government and are now more reliant on suicide bombings against civilians. For example, 
suicide bombing related deaths comprised 3% of Boko Haram related deaths in 2013, but 
have since jumped to close to 30% in 2018. In the first half of 2018 alone there were 30 
suicide bombings.76 Importantly the Council on Foreign Relations report states, “the group 
has derived its support from a deeply impoverished population that has long felt neglected 
by the central government.”77  
Today, the fight against Boko Haram is ongoing, as the government tries to respond 
to persistent attacks and kidnappings. The issue has been complicated by deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions in part caused by desertification of Lake Chad. When 
discussing the methods of fighting Boko Haram, Onuoha argues that the group itself is 
built on a tripod. The three pillars of their strength come from covert support from 
politicians, influential ideologues connected to other terror groups in the region, and finally 
the susceptibility of Nigerian youth to the enticements of the group’s relative size and 
strength compared to one’s own impoverishment.78 Importantly, Boko Haram draws 
support from northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Sudan--essentially the Lake Chad Basin. 
Furthermore, its members are mostly “disaffected youths, unemployed graduates, and 
former almajiris.”79 Almajiris are poor children who are sent to live and study under 
powerful Islamic preachers. 
Boko Haram’s strength is due, partly, to its financing. It is estimated that while 
being a relatively low-cost insurgency, the group has an annual income of around $10 
million.80 Funding generally comes from illicit activities including kidnappings, robberies, 
extortion, looting, and other commercial activities. In 2013 and 2014 for example, Boko 
Haram earned $11 million from five different kidnapping incidents and another $6 million 
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from bank robberies.81 Their relatively high income in a region with widespread poverty 
gives the group the ability to recruit via economic incentives. The next section will look 
closely at how deteriorating environmental conditions in Lake Chad are harming traditional 
livelihoods in the region, and how that subsequently may be feeding into Boko Haram’s 
recruitment. 
E. SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF THE LAKE CHAD BASIN 
It is difficult to overestimate how significant Lake Chad is to the continued health 
of the rural communities that occupy its shores. Data from a 1993 survey revealed that 59% 
of people reported a majority of their income came from farming, while 36% reported a 
mixture of fishing and farming for income, and 5% relied solely on fishing.82 More recent 
data from the Global Water Partnership reveals that the structure of the economy has not 
changed much, with 60% of the population reporting a majority of their income coming 
from agriculture in 2011.83  
Farming in the Lake Chad basin can be in one of three varieties. These include 
rainfed farming, flood-recession farming, and irrigated agriculture.84 As the name 
suggests, rainfed farming takes place during the rainy season without the use of irrigation. 
Flood-recession farming takes advantage of the varying lake levels and exposed fertile soil 
of floodplains when water recedes.85 A recent report on the state of the ecosystem states 
“flood recession farming is practiced by a large majority of the population around the lake 
and remains a household practice, although some mechanical interventions are undertaken 
to develop cash crops.”86 The third type of farming is irrigated agriculture, which, as the 
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report also states, “is becoming increasingly widespread to meet the growing demand of 
the population and the vulnerability of rainfed agriculture to climate stress.”87  
Major cash crops in the basin include peanuts, cotton, millet, rice, and onions. 
Economic activities also extend to metal ore extraction and more recently oil exploration 
and production.88 The basin economy rests on the flexibility of its population. The report 
explains that “spaces are generally multifunctional and ethnic groups have learned to 
diversify their activities to accommodate flooding and climate variability allowing 
different resources to be exploited on the same space.”89 Due to the lake’s fluctuating 
levels, few people are able to rely on a single source of income.90 Fishing and farming 
follow the natural flood and drought cycles. When water reaches its peak around mid-
January, work focuses primarily on fishing. When the dry season begins, the lake recedes, 
revealing fertile land which is then used for farming.91 Historically, the mid-1980s 
experienced a drought most similar to what is currently happening. Responding to the 
continued recession, communities were re-established on newly revealed land and farming 
began on what was previously lake floor. Significantly, this was a period when the farmers 
were doing very well and producing a food surplus.92 Records also reveal that a reduction 
in the fishing industry increased the number of people farming, which led to some violent 
clashes between farmers over land.93  
Demographically, the basin is young, growing rapidly, and struggling to cope with 
the changes. In 2010, for example, it was reported that 44% of the population was below 
the age of 14.94 The fertility rate in Nigeria is 6.01 due to a combination of a high 
proportion of the population being within child-bearing age (45% of women are between 
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the ages of 15–4595) and little to no family planning or access to contraceptives. As a result, 
predictions show that “the lakeside population living within a radius of 300km will grow 
from 13 million inhabitants in 2012 to at least 35 million by 2050.”96 Meanwhile states 
face challenges in providing the necessary infrastructure and employment opportunities for 
an expanding population. The previous report states, “on completing school, many young 
people face unemployment due to the lack of jobs.”97 
Increased rates of migration, specifically migration in and around the Lake Chad 
region itself, have been prompted by the flexibility of the basin economy, climate change, 
and conflict. Interestingly, recent reports provide evidence that livelihood loss is relatively 
minor when discussing reasons for migration. According to the UN Migration Agency, in 
a report from February 2019, 34.5% cited ongoing conflict as their reason for moving and 
another 35% cited fear of attacks. Additionally, 16.5% stated poor living conditions as their 
primary driver for moving.98  One reason for  migration is due to the seasonal nature of 
the basin economy. its residents are uniquely suited to migrate and adapt to changing 
ecological conditions. As noted previously, the economy is based on lake fluctuations so 
when the water is high, fish are the primary commodity, and when the water is low, most 
Nigerians switch to farming on the newly exposed fertile land. Due to the adaptable 
economy migratory patterns follow the water level.  
Second, the region is also home to pastoralists who are nomadic by nature and thus 
migration is a way of life. As  new grassland shorelines open up, new migration patterns 
are evolving, as well as agriculture occurring where previously there had been a fishing 
economy.99 This is the case with the Darak subdivision, which had not previously been 
suitable for farming, but has become an important location for agro-pastoralists.100 
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Migration into previously aquatic regions has induced intercommunal conflict. As Zieba et 
al. write “competition for land resources is resulting in violent conflicts between members 
of different communities.”101 For example, in Darak there is a dispute between the 
Nigerians who claim they settled in Darak first and the Cameroonians who claim the sub-
division falls within their territory.102 One observation from this example is that there are 
multiple different types of conflict in the Lake Chad region. Additionally, these conflicts 
follow their own unique causal pathway. The dispute over the Darak subdivision lends 
support to my second hypothesis regarding migration because there is conflict as a result 
of movement to newly revealed land.  
Third, attacks by Boko Haram are also prompting migration. According to the most 
recent Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), there were 6,931 movements recorded in the 
week of 04–10 February 2019. Movements, according to the DTM report, include 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, returnees from abroad, and returnees who 
were previously IDPs. An important characteristic of the basin economy is its flexibility, 
which, when combined with the ongoing threat from Boko Haram and climate change, has 
caused significant migration. 
F. REGIONAL LIVELIHOODS AND THE PULL OF EXTREMISM 
In spite of the fact that the recession of the Lake may have been good for farmers 
in the short run, continued drought and increased rainfall variability have disrupted 
traditional livelihoods. According to a recent FAO report, the drought has caused a 60% 
decline in fish production and a 46.5% decline in crop production.103  Between 1960 and 
2010, total annual fish yields have gone from 220,000 tons to roughly 60,000 tons.104 
Moreover, in spite of receding water exposing more fertile ground, there has been a 
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reduction in crop yields. For example, sorghum yields have decreased from 328,000  tons 
in the late 1960s to 180,000 tons in 2010.105 Furthermore, livestock has been declining at 
a rate of 2% per year since the 1960s.106 The lake’s recession is having a direct effect on 
the fishing and farming in the Lake Chad Basin.  
Affected communities are unable to adapt and mitigate the negative effects of a 
drying lake due to a combination of limited capital and government neglect. One example 
of this is that, as Okpara et al. write, “scarce local infrastructure…weaken trade networks 
and prevent people from earning sufficient income from the sale of agricultural produce.” 
The authors continue, “governments often display unwillingness to invest in infrastructural 
development at lakeshore locations whose future is uncertain or whose jurisdiction is 
unclear.”107 While the government could have invested in its people and eased the strain 
caused by livelihood disruption, policymakers failed to deliver adequate institutional 
change. According to Okpara, this has left Nigerians with “constrained capacities to create 
locally adapted solutions that both reduce poverty and enhance well-being.”108 The 
combination of livelihood insecurity, government neglect, and inability to adapt thus 
creates a sense of deprivation, especially as access to resources declines.109 
In response to the lack of government action, the international community has 
attempted to build community resilience. A conference held in Germany in 2018 states “the 
crisis has led to massive internal and cross-border displacement of 2.4 million people, 
destruction of livelihoods, disruption of local governance systems, human rights abuses, 
and disruption of health, education, and other basic services.”110 The loss of the Lake Chad 
ecosystem is devastating to livelihoods due to the lake’s historical abundance. In the 1960s 
for instance, “the lake hosted about 135 species of fish and fishermen captured 200,000 
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metric tonnes of fish every year, providing an important source of food security and income 
to the basin’s populace and beyond.”111 The fact that such an ecological disaster is 
unfolding in tandem with Boko Haram’s rise has given voice to those that see livelihood 
loss as a driving factor in insurgencies. Some theorists see this as “a perfect recruiting 
ground for the Islamist militants. The offer of a little cash and the promise of some training 
and a gun persuaded many to join.”112 
Boko Haram recruiting is deeply rooted in the socio-economic conditions of the 
communities in which they operate. Dating back to their founding in 2002, the group 
routinely adopted, educated, and indoctrinated impoverished youth in their specific 
interpretation of Islam. These Almajiris demonstrate the role poverty plays in directing 
people towards a life of extremism. Meagher makes the point that Boko Haram is an 
attractive option for livelihood insecure Nigerians because “[they] offered one meal a day, 
arranged low-cost marriages, and provided loans for petty commercial activities, thus 
offering basic social dignity to the poor and unemployed.”113 As fishing and farming 
industries shrink, the opportunity cost of joining an insurgency is lowered. Suddenly, when 
confronting enduring poverty and starvation, joining Boko Haram may seem more 
palatable for Borno State residents.  
This is backed up with a SIPRI report from May of 2017 which states the 
importance of combatting climate change-induced livelihood loss as a way to foment 
community resilience and stop individuals from joining Boko Haram.114 Moreover, a 
USIP report, conducting research on why youth join Boko Haram, released some statistics 
which depict the role livelihood loss plays in insurgent recruiting. For example, in 2011, 
100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty, with the worst rates of poverty in the 
Northeast, around Lake Chad. Furthermore, survey research in Kaduna state revealed that 
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83% of people say that unemployment and poverty are direct causes of youth religious 
violence.115 Additionally, the study found that children with difficult upbringings are also 
more vulnerable to extremist ideology.116 Thus, the consequences of livelihood loss might 
extend intergenerationally. The progeny of an impoverished farmer might be equally 
susceptible to the enticements of Boko Haram as the farmer himself.  
One particularly successful tactic used by Boko Haram to recruit Nigerian youth is 
the provision of business loans. According to a 2016 Mercy Corps report, Boko Haram 
exploits the ambitions of local youth and their desire to achieve financial success by 
granting  loans in exchange for joining the group.117 Due to scarce formal employment 
opportunities and localized inequality, becoming a successful business owner is one way 
for youth to get ahead. However, they often do not have the ability to start a business 
without an injection of capital from a third party. Boko Haram is able to exploit this vacuum 
and the ambitions of local youths in order to strengthen their numbers.118 As the report 
states “the tactics practiced by Boko Haram resemble organized criminal gangs and their 
practice of doling out favors, only to demand repayment at a high cost. Either not fully 
aware of the unspoken conditions or unwilling to take the risk, these youth were drawn into 
a dangerous situation with the promise of support to their business.”119  
A recent Afrobarometer report provides some statistics which lend support to 
economic factors driving Nigerians to extremist groups. Of those individuals surveyed, the 
researchers found that 31% of Nigerians cite unemployment, or a lack of economic 
opportunities, as the primary reason for joining an insurgency. The next highest response 
was poverty with 27% of respondents citing this as the key reason. The next two highest 
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responses were religious beliefs (11%) and the ineffectiveness of the government (9%).120 
Then when asked to identify the most effective way of addressing the problem of armed 
extremists, 46% responded with “improve the economy and create more jobs.”121 The 
second most popular response was to strengthen military response or military capabilities 
with 43% of those surveyed having this as their first or second response. 
The 2017 UNDP report “Journey to Extremism” found that the economy was a 
strong contributing factor in an individual’s choice to join an extremist group. For example, 
34% people responded with employment when asked the question “what was the most 
immediate need at the time of joining the organization?”122 The importance of the 
economy is further evidenced by the fact that 13% of respondents stated that employment 
was an important component for their reason for joining. Moreover, the researchers found 
evidence that Nigerians who were either fully employed or full time students were less 
likely to join altogether or took longer to join than their unemployed peers.123 However, 
the role that the economy plays in driving extremism is more complex than the correlation 
of more unemployment causing more extremism. As the report states “economic factors 
are likely to be a critical component of the overall incentives and drivers leading to 
recruitment in many cases, although at the same time are also unlikely to be the sole 
factor.”124  
Additional factors that increased successful extremist recruiting were grievances 
generated from perceived economic woes, a general lack of education, and a communal 
precedent for violent extremism. Moreover, the presence of strong social recruiting 
networks for insurgent groups, misunderstandings of religious texts, and a deep mistrust of 
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the government, politicians, police, military, and other apparatuses of the state were other 
factors contributing to Boko Haram’s ability to recruit.125 The report attempts to paint a 
picture of the profile of a violent extremist with some descriptive statistics. According to 
the researchers 33% have four years or fewer of secular education, 51% cite religious 
reasons for joining while 57% report never reading or understanding religious texts. 
Although these numbers may seem contradictory at first glance, it actually highlights the 
fact that some Nigerians join extremist groups for religious reasons without being able to 
interpret holy texts. Rather than thinking for themselves and deciding what to believe some 
rely on itinerant preachers for religious guidance.126 Moreover, 83% feel that “the 
government only looks after the interests of a few.”127 Both the Afrobarometer and UNDP 
reports on the drivers of violent extremism illustrate the important role that poor economic 
conditions plays on extremism. It is likely that widespread poverty and unemployment 
make affected communities more vulnerable to extremists; however, other factors like 
perceptions of inequality, low education levels, and a history of government abuse are also 
drivers of violent extremism.  
Crucially, the dynamic between Boko Haram and livelihoods works in the opposite 
direction as well. The Boko Haram insurgency is having deleterious effects on those 
working in communities where the group is conducting terror operations. A 2018 UNDP 
report told the story of the Ngwom community, which had previously been thriving up 
until its brush with Boko Haram. Ngwom suffered attacks by the terrorist group in 2014 
and 2016 leading to the death of 100 Nigerians and the displacement of roughly 2300 more 
to neighboring host communities.128 Unfortunately their story is not an isolated one. In the 
roughly nine years that Boko Haram has been actively conducting terror operations, there 
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has been an estimated two million displaced Nigerians.129 This shows that terrorism and 
livelihoods are closely related in both directions of the causal chain. On one hand, Lake 
Chad’s recession is increasing community vulnerability due to the negative effects it has 
had on fishing and farming. Then, as the local insurgency grows in strength, its members 
are able to conduct attacks on susceptible communities, further increasing livelihood 
instability. It is a vicious cycle of insecurity begetting insecurity. 
One additional factor contributing to Boko Haram’s ability to recruit is the 
inequality between northern and southern Nigeria. For example, Meagher argues that while 
the Nigerian economy has advanced in recent years, the gains have disproportionately been 
felt by southern Nigerians. She writes, “owing to a history of educational disadvantage in 
the Muslim north, the region has been perversely affected by economic restructuring, 
leaving it less able to seize the new opportunities created by Nigeria’s economic 
resurgence.”130 She continues, “Recurrent drought, neglect of agriculture, 
deindustrialisation, and public sector retrenchment have gutted the northern rural and urban 
economy, while the more educated southern zones of Nigeria have been able to benefit 
from liberalisation and diversification into high-value services.”131 The dependence on 
agriculture and fishing for survival in the north has made the communities susceptible to 
climate change and unable to transition to new jobs. This has limited their ability to absorb 
the benefits of Nigeria’s growing economy. It is also possible that the apparent divide 
between regional economic success contributes to anti-government grievances due 
growing inequality. The fact that organizations such as the UNDP, USIP, and SIPRI all 
focus on building community resilience to combat Boko Haram is indicative of the role 
livelihoods play in the insurgents’ ability to conduct terror. 
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G. DISCUSSION 
Tracing Boko Haram’s history and Lake Chad’s changing ecology shows that there 
is an association between the two. First, one can observe that lake-bordering communities 
are extremely dependent on the lake for subsistence and livelihoods. Furthermore, data 
from the past 50 years shows that the present drought is worse than previous years. It has 
likely been made worse by climate change, with most experts predicting the situation will 
worsen rather than improve. High birth rates and internal migration are adding to local 
population growth, which further stresses resource scarcity. Water scarcity is having 
measurable negative effects on fishing and farming productivity, which cause livelihood 
loss amongst communities in the Lake Chad basin.  
Boko Haram has a history of recruiting from struggling communities and 
impoverished youth. Moreover, terror attacks on struggling communities leads to more 
livelihood loss. Thus, it would seem that the relationship between water scarcity and Boko 
Haram is cyclical, with livelihood loss acting as the operant variable between the two; Lake 
Chad recession reduces community resilience, which strengthens Boko Haram. Then, as 
Boko Haram gains strength and is able to conduct more terror activities, this further reduces 
community resilience and the cycle repeats. 
What this tells us about water security and conflict is that, although people are not 
fighting over water directly, the second and third order effects can be a destabilizing force, 
especially for at risk communities. This finding lends support for the hypothesis that it is 
disrupted livelihoods which links water scarcity and conflict. On Lake Chad’s shores, the 
economy is hugely dependent on the agricultural sector for livelihoods. Drought and 
overpopulation contribute to growing water scarcity, which then disrupts livelihood 
security. High birth rates, low access to capital, and government neglect have created a 
large group of disaffected youth who see Nigerian politicians as a cause of their problems. 
Boko Haram is able to exploit this sentiment along with economic incentives to attract 
Nigerian youth to their cause.  
One issue to address is why violent extremism did not emerge in the 1980s when 
the Sahel experienced drought comparable to what is occurring at present. The reason is 
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that water scarcity alone is not enough to create violent extremism. In a vacuum, water 
scarcity will not create conflict; however, it will act as an amplifier to existing conflict, 
especially when the state does not have the capacity to mitigate its effects.  
For years, the Nigerian government has recognized issues posed by Lake Chad’s 
recession and has consistently failed to take appropriate action. The fact that inefficient 
water usage is a key reason for lake recession means that adopting measures such as 
breaching the North-South barrier and investment in drought-resistant crops would provide 
some relief. Moreover, corruption and income inequality have only fed into Boko Haram 
and their overarching theme that Western influence is evil.  
These findings lend support to my  second  and fourth hypothesis due to the fact 
that there were things which the government could have done to alleviate the scarcity issue, 
yet they chose to take insufficient action. It is likely that there is less supporting evidence 
for these hypotheses in the 1980s because demand was not as high as it is presently due to 
rising population. Evidence from the Darak subdivision supports the third hypothesis, 
because migration created new spaces for intercommunal competition. Additionally, it 
appears there is a relationship between hypotheses three and four, as some migration is 
caused livelihood insecurity.  
The water crisis in the Lake Chad basin is having a strong impact on destabilizing 
communities which are most susceptible to Boko Haram. Furthermore, income inequality 
and government corruption have only increased antipathy from Boko Haram and others in 







III. OIL POLLUTION AND VIOLENCE IN 
THE NIGER DELTA 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
The oil business in Nigeria has historically been accompanied by corruption, greed, 
and violence. In the Niger Delta, residents have been exploited by oil companies since the 
resource’s discovery in 1956. In response to growing inequality and ecological devastation 
protest movements such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
have fought for justice. This chapter answers the question, what role has oil pollution 
played in the creation and persistence of violent protest movements in the Delta? I find that 
the resultant ecological degradation disrupted livelihoods, which, combined with a weak 
response by the government, contributed to violence.  
The chapter first addresses the history of oil in Nigeria, followed by an overview 
of the resultant environmental damage. This is followed by a discussion of the effects of 
pollution on livelihoods. The precipitation of local grievances is examined with a historical 
focus on Ken Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP with a focus on livelihood disruption and the role 
these disruptions played in motivating protests. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
about how oil pollution and scarcity in a broader sense might induce violent protest. Lastly, 
this chapter assesses how more recent violent groups such as MEND and the NDA are 
related to MOSOP and whether the issue of pollution is a key reason for their grievances.  
B. OIL DISCOVERY AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
Nigerian oil production began in 1956 when the resource was first discovered in 
the Oloibiri fields by The Royal British Petroleum Company. Production began in 1958,132 
and between the start of production and 1983, the oil industry generated approximately 
$101 billion in revenue.133 Nigeria was, and remains, a good example of the deleterious 
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effects of the resource curse. As the oil industry grew and state leaders became more 
dependent on resource revenues, agriculture was neglected and production of key cash 
crops dropped. According to some estimates, “between 1970 and 1982 cocoa, rubber, 
cotton, and ground nuts – fell by 43, 29, 65, and 64 percent, respectively.”134 By 1980, the 
oil market had swelled so that it comprised 96% of external revenue for the state and 27% 
of GDP.135 When oil was first discovered in Nigeria, the hope was that it would bring 
wealth to the people. However, as the industry evolved, the benefits of increased revenue 
were disproportionately beneficial to a select group of elites. 
A big part of the reason oil revenue did not benefit the everyday Nigerian is the 
organization of the petroleum industry. In 1971, Nigeria nationalized the oil industry. Then, 
in 1978, the Land Use Act transferred land rights from the local people to the federal 
government. According to Okonta and Douglas, this ensured that “the people of the Niger 
Delta could not challenge the expropriation of their natural resources by the central 
government in Lagos in a court of law.”136 The de facto consequences of such laws were 
that oil revenue was concentrated solely the hands of the federal government. The fact that 
the people were seeing none of this revenue itself was one reason why Nigerians, especially 
in the oil regions, were so angry at the oil industry. 
Most oil production is in the form of joint ventures between the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) and foreign oil companies.137 There are currently six joint 
ventures total in Nigeria involving NNPC and other companies including Agip, Texaco, 
and Mobil.138 The largest producer of Nigerian oil is a joint venture between NNPC and 
Shell. This joint venture, established in 1979, is the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria (SPDC) and is responsible for 60% of all oil production in Nigeria. 
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The arrangement is such that NNPC holds 55% of shares, Shell holds 30%, Elf 10%, and 
Agip 5%.139 Due to SPDC’s vital role in oil production, as well as the government’s 
dependence on petroleum for revenue, Shell has been able to influence national politics. 
This created a situation in the Delta where a private company could operate with relative 
impunity and little fear of repercussions, regardless of the level of pollution it caused.  
C. OIL POLLUTION AND ITS IMPACTS 
The negative environmental effects of oil exploitation are numerous and far 
reaching. A case study into oil pollution in the Niger Delta is a case study of unmitigated 
resource extraction with little or no attention paid to potential ecological implications. The 
Delta Mangrove Swamp spans 1900 square kilometers and is the largest mangrove swamp 
in Africa.140  It is also considered one of the ten most important wetlands in the world.141 
This is due to its role as both a fishing and wildlife nursery and because it acts as a natural 
pollution filter. The Niger Delta wetlands are also a vital ecosystem to the fishing and 
farming industry in the region. 
Some of the ways oil is negatively affecting the local environment include 
contamination of streams and rivers, oil spills, forest destruction, biodiversity loss, gas 
flaring, and effluent discharge.142  The largest and most visible environmental concern is 
oil spillage. To quantify the amounts of oil being spilled, Kadafa reports “an estimated 9 
million – 13 million tons of oil has been spilled in to the Niger Delta ecosystem over the 
past 50 years.”143 To put this in perspective, that would be the equivalent of 50 Exxon 
Valdez oil spills.144 The oil spill problem is having a measurable negative impact on the 
wetlands. For example, a blowout of the Funiwa no. 5 well in 1980 resulted in the spillage 
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of 421,000 barrels of oil and the consequent destruction of 836 acres of mangrove forest.145 
These incidents are unfortunately all too common; between 1976 and 1990 it was reported 
that Shell alone was responsible for 2,796 oil spill incidents resulting in 2,105,393 barrels 
spilled.146  
A second big issue in the Delta is gas flaring. This is a practice in which natural gas 
is burned in the petroleum extraction process, rather than separated from oil and consumed. 
The reason gas flaring is prevalent in Nigeria is because the country lacks sufficient 
infrastructure to distribute and consume the gas. Measurements taken between 1970 and 
1986 show that 81.7 % of all available gas was flared, leaving a small portion for domestic 
consumption.147 According to a report released by the Energetic Solution Conference in 
2004, the 123 gas flaring sites in Nigeria burn 1.8 billion cubic feet of gas every day, 
discharging 45.8 billion kilowatts of heat into the atmosphere.  
In 2017, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) issued a report detailing the 
extent of environmental damage in Ogoniland, a state which borders the Niger Delta, and 
is home to substantial oil production. Its findings paint a grim picture for the current and 
future state of the Delta. The starting estimates for how long it would take to conduct a full 
environmental recovery are 25 to 30 years.148 Mangrove forests, which are a key part of 
the Delta ecosystem, are coated in bitumen, a byproduct of oil production. These forests 
act as both a nursery for fish and wildlife and as a filter for pollution. Therefore, ecological 
destruction is a self-perpetuating cycle as nature loses its ability to clean itself. Ash and tar 
coat coastlines because fires have become more prevalent with large amounts of oil 
spillage. This makes successful ecological rehabilitation more difficult. Creeks in and 
around Ogoniland have a visible oily sheen and the fishing industry is taking a hit as fish 
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migrate towards cleaner water away from the polluted Delta. Moreover, fish farms are 
increasingly difficult to maintain because the water is unfit for marine life.149  
There is also evidence that pollution is a direct threat to public health. UNEP 
scientists reported finding an 8 cm layer of refined oil floating on the groundwater in 
Ogoniland which serves community wells used for drinking water This coincides with the 
finding that “in one community…in Western Ogoniland, families are drinking from wells 
that are contaminated with Benzene – a known carcinogen – at levels over 900 times above 
World Health Organization guidelines.”150 
Gas flaring is known to contribute to acid rain, as groundwater samples have 
illustrated. The normal Ph of water is 6.5 to 8.5 while the pH collected as part of a UNDP 
report had a pH of between 3.35 to 5.58.151 Acid rain can adversely impact health of the 
communities as well as local wildlife.  
D. SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF OIL ON LIVELIHOODS 
Oil pollution has been detrimental to local populations due to the Delta’s economic 
structure and consequent loss of traditional livelihoods. The region’s largest employment 
sectors include agriculture, fishing, and forestry which collectively employ 44.2% of the 
people.152 Small markets and household industry account for 17.4% of employment. The 
next two largest sectors are services (9.8%) and education and health (7.1%).153 The 
northern, inland portions of the Delta region tend to have a more diversified land-based 
economy. States that are closer to the water are generally more reliant on fishing. Farming 
is generally small-scale and only for subsistence. The average household engaged in 
farming owns less than one hectare of land. Major crops include cassava, yams, and maize. 
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The Delta provides the largest source of shrimp in West Africa. Fishing activities generally 
consist of canoes and passive gear. However, due to declining aquatic resources, Nigeria 
is the largest importer of fish products in Africa.154 Forests provide timber, fruits and 
vegetables, and serve as a source of wild game and snails.155 The oil sector employs a 
disproportionately small proportion of Nigerians, in comparison to its importance to the 
country’s economy. The National Bureau of Statistics reported that only 0.01% of 
Nigerians worked in the oil industry.156  
While the Delta region’s residents do not see the benefits of oil production, they 
feel its costs in the disruption of their traditional livelihoods. Ipingbemi’s 2009 report 
utilized a questionnaire dispersed to the Burutu region of the Delta to collect primary 
source data on the impacts of environmental degradation on livelihoods. According to 
Ipingebemi, whenever oil spills occur, 88.4% of those surveyed claim their businesses 
suffered in the days following the spill.157 The author goes on to report that the detrimental 
impacts of oil pollution has led to “43.0% of respondents [changing] their means of 
livelihoods whereas 25.5% intend to change theirs.”158 Those that reported changing or 
considering changing their livelihoods stated that the primary motivating factor included 
“no catches immediately after major oil spillages, dwindling income over the years and 
low demand for products/commodities during and after an oil spillage.”159  
The UNDP cites “occupational disorientation” as one of the greatest challenges to 
development in the Delta. The report states: 
Fishing and agriculture have suffered so much from environmental 
problems and social challenges, and from the neglect of successive 
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governments, that it is very difficult to motivate young people to take an 
interest in these livelihoods. Many youths, even those still residing in rural 
areas, are more interested in rent-seeking from oil operations in the form of 
standby money or oil bunkering, hostage-taking and sabotage of oil 
pipelines.160 
Livelihood loss is also a contributing factor to urban migration. The lack of 
employment opportunities in rural communities has prompted people to move to cities 
outside of the Delta region which in turn has caused, as Stanley states, “urban sprawl, slum 
housing, traffic congestion, unemployment, and underemployment.” Furthermore, this has 
prompted a breakdown in traditional authority structures and a sense of community. As a 
consequence, youth unemployment and rates of illicit activities have risen.  
One interesting dynamic in the Delta is that perceptions of the oil company differ 
by region. The coastal communities in the southern Delta generally harbor more animosity 
towards oil companies than do the northern communities.161 This difference is noted in 
Stanley’s 1990 report where he lays claim that southern communities have more negative 
feelings due to the communities’ closeness to oil pollution. He writes “The South has visual 
and heat sensitive gas flaring, oil containment ponds, artificial canals, and all of the 
conspicuous and frequently less desired manifestations of exploration, extraction and 
transportation of oil.”162 The north differs from the south, in that it is responsible for the 
refining side of the oil business. Refineries are generally further away from the population 
than extraction, leaving the socio-economic conditions more intact.163 The association 
between regional perceptions of ecological damage and negative feelings towards oil 
companies hints at a link between the two and a possible role in fomenting violent protest. 
Due to its close proximity, the petroleum industry becomes a convenient source of blame 
for local animosity.  
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The Niger Delta economy has traditionally relied on agriculture, fishing, and 
farming for sustainable livelihoods. Oil has played a large role in eliminating these 
traditional livelihoods due to the negative effects of pollution. Furthermore, the legal 
system is structured in a way that prevents peaceful conflict resolution. The next section 
examines how the Nigerian judiciary benefits oil companies at the expense of its citizens. 
E. LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR DELTA COMMUNITIES 
This section outlines the difficulties faced by Niger Delta communities whose 
residents attempted to challenge the petroleum industry through litigation. The findings 
lend support to the third hypothesis, which posits that institutions play an important role in 
mitigating the negative effects of ecological damage. In the case of the Niger Delta, judicial 
institutions made it very difficult to peaceably resolve the pollution crisis.  
Two reasons for continued environmental pollution are government corruption and 
difficulties challenging Shell in court. Petro-states are notorious for government 
corruption.164 Due to the state’s reliance on oil for revenue, top level government officials 
are very susceptible to bribes from oil companies. Additionally, the Nigerian oil industry 
lends itself to corruption due to its complexity, concentration of revenue flows, and the 
natural monopolies it creates.165 Corruption manifests itself in several key ways in 
Nigerian petro-politics. For example, the government is responsible for awarding licenses 
and contracts. Under the Nigerian Petroleum Act, the Minister of Petroleum has near 
complete authority when it comes to the allocation of licenses.166 Furthermore, 
government officials have significant power in granting large scale contracts to oil 
companies and may benefit from awarding contracts to companies in which they have a 
personal stake.167 Historically, there have been some overt cases of corruption exposed at 
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a high level. One such instance occurred in December of 2009 when James Ibori, the former 
governor of the Delta State, was acquitted in a Nigerian court for 170 charges filed against 
him by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. He would later be jailed in a 
British court for fraud and the embezzlement of N12.6 billion.168 Another high profile 
example of corruption was the 2002 Halliburton scandal in which it was revealed that the 
U.S. oil company was guilty of paying out $180 million in bribes to top officials in order 
to secure four contracts for LNG facilities in Nigeria.169 Clearly the petroleum industry is 
closely linked to corruption in Nigeria. A lackadaisical government attitude towards 
regulation combined with corruption make litigation extremely difficult for Delta states. 
In spite of a lack of enforcement there is some environmental policy in place. In 
1999 the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was established, which attempted 
to institute a policy to safeguard the environment and improve air, water, and land 
resources.170 The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is tasked with “monitoring 
the operations of oil companies, setting and enforcing environmental standards, collecting 
royalties and rents, as well as supervising and ensuring compliance with oil industry 
regulations.”171 The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Industry (NOSDRA) is 
tasked with monitoring and assisting the detection and subsequent clean-up of oil spills. 
Problematically, the State Environmental Protection Agencies (SEPAs), which would be 
best suited at detecting and fighting environmental degradation in the individual states, 
lack the power to take any meaningful action. Instead, the federal government, drowning 
in corruption, possesses the most power to actually protect the environment.172 Thus, the 
SEPAs are close in proximity to ecological fallout, yet lack the ability to protect their land.  
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There are two key legal challenges to responsible government regulation. First, 
NOSDRA itself cannot detect oil spills and instead relies on oil companies to report the 
spill within 24 hours or risk a penalty.173 This makes it easier for an oil company to conceal 
the extent to which they may be polluting the land and inhibits a rapid response to an oil 
spill. Second, the Land Use Act limits corporate responsibility of an oil company in the 
event of sabotage as a cause of spillage. Consequently, Ogbannaya writes “oil companies 
in Nigeria have taken advantage of this sabotage alibi and absence of effective regulations 
to perpetrate irresponsible practices and adopt production methods which maximize profit 
and minimize investment in environmental safety.”174  
There have been some successful lawsuits from Nigerians against Shell. However, 
the size and strength of Shell, in addition to the fact that they are a multinational 
corporation, has made it resilient to legal challenges. Some successful examples include 
Umudje v. Shell-BP Petroleum (1975) where the company was held responsible for 
damages to lakes and rivers of the plaintiff by the Nigerian Supreme Court.175 
Unfortunately, in 2017 the High Court in London ruled that Royal Dutch Shell could not 
be sued in London for damages resulting from oil spills in Nigerian communities.176  
Corrupt business practices and legal problems are unfolding currently. Due to government 
corruption and difficulties in holding Shell responsible in its native country, successful tort 
litigation in Nigeria may not result in desired compensation. Oil companies in Nigeria 
pollute the environment knowingly, deny their role, and instead of assuming responsibility, 
pass the buck to local Nigerians. This speaks to the institutional hypothesis because, if the 
rule of law was stronger, then there would have been more opportunities to resolve 
grievances legally rather than resorting to violence.  
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F. OGONI AND MOSOP CASE STUDY 
The case of the Ogoni people, MOSOP, and Ken Saro Wiwa provides an example 
of how the loss of livelihoods may lead to violence. The evolution of violence began with 
the loss of livelihoods in Ogoniland and was made worse by actions taken by the Nigerian 
government. First, assessing the impact of oil pollution on Ogoniland in particular, it is 
clear that livelihoods were severely negatively impacted by Shell’s activities. The SPDC 
reportedly had a system of above ground and poorly maintained pipes in the Ogoni State 
which consistently leaked oil.177 Shell also reportedly passed the blame on to local farmers 
for spills, claiming the pipes were sabotaged.178 Gas flaring was reported to have created 
a “permanent scorched earth regime,” and the Bomu oil spill and Ibobu oil spills in 1973 
were responsible for widespread loss of fishing and farming land.179 As Crayford writes, 
“the placement of pipelines and other oil facilities has also had a damaging effect simply 
by taking up large amounts of precious farmland for which the Ogoni claim they are poorly 
paid and occasionally not even consulted.” In short, Shell was polluting, burning, and 
taking land from the Ogoni people without compensation.180 
The collective loss of livelihood created a communal sense of suffering amongst 
the people. This created a situation very conducive to Ogoni mobilization to solve their 
issues.181 Together the communal suffering, combined with a rising sense of urgency as 
degradation worsened, created facilitating conditions for Ken Saro-Wiwa to form the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The struggle for greater Ogoni 
rights has its roots in 1945 when the Ogoni Central Union was formed in order to have a 
stronger united voice when competing for government resources.182 Early efforts to unify 
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the Ogonis grew stronger in the 1980s as the people realized, in the midst of environmental 
destruction and political exploitation, that they shared a common goal in addition to a 
common ethnicity. At the start, MOSOP’s leaders worked at the grassroots level, building 
community support with the help of local clan leaders. They raised awareness about the 
Ogoni people’s socioeconomic and environmental plight, utilizing propaganda. They also 
promised money in return for membership when they received compensation from oil 
companies.183 External factors such as Nigeria’s transition to democracy, increased 
environmental awareness, and the increased militancy of the current regime all served 
Saro-Wiwa’s cause.  
The group’s first action was to write an Ogoni Bill of Rights targeting perceived 
exploitation by the Nigerian Government and Shell.184  The Bill of Rights demanded “1. 
Ogoni Political autonomy within a wider Nigerian confederation of states. 2. Protection of 
local Ogoni languages. 3. Control of a fair share of the economic resources derived from 
Ogoni land. 4. Protection of Ogoni environment.”185 The role of environmental 
degradation to the movement was paramount. This is backed up by some of Saro-Wiwa’s 
rhetoric when he accused Shell of “reckless oil exploitation or ecological warfare.”186 In 
a statement to the Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal in 1995, Saro-Wiwa describes the 
Ogoni people as living with no social amenities, in extreme poverty, and plagued by high 
rates of unemployment. The Ogoni were “faced with environmental degradation, political 
marginalization, economic strangulation, slavery, and possible extinction.”187 In short, 
MOSOP was dedicated to fighting for the Ogoni people and seeking justice against Shell 
and the Nigerian government for exploiting their state’s people and resources.  
The beginning of the protests was relatively peaceful and mostly consisted of acts 
of passive resistance. For example, on January 4, 1993 MOSOP leadership organized the 
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first Ogoni Day which attracted upwards of 300,000 to engage in benign festivities.188 
However, the actions taken by the Nigerian Government served to intensify the movement 
rather than mitigate the potential uprising. On 15 July, 1993 there were one hundred and 
thirty-two Ogoni men, women, and children massacred on the banks of the Andoni River. 
The Police Commissioner of Rivers State refused to conduct an investigation. Then on the 
5th and 6th of August, the Ogoni market village of Kaa was attacked with grenades, mortar 
shells, and automatic weapons. According to Saro-Wiwa, his contacts informed him that 
more attacks were planned for the border territories between the Okrika and Ndoki sub-
groups by the government as a coordinated effort to undermine MOSOP.189 This is further 
evidenced by the fact that Human Rights Watch received statements from two soldiers 
involved in the massacres claiming they had been ordered to “shoot everyone who crossed 
our path.”190  
With the death toll rising and increasing tension between the government and 
MOSOP, the international community began to take note of the events unfolding. With the 
Ogoni crisis now in the international spotlight, human rights activists documented 
“instances of detentions, harassment, and the extrajudicial executions of MOSOP 
activists.”191 The crisis became more violent when ethnic clashes broke out between the 
Ogoni and the Andonis, a separate ethnic group in the Delta. Some of MOSOP’s leaders 
claimed the increase in ethnic violence was actively promoted by the government.192 Ken 
Saro-Wiwa himself explained how the Nigerian government orchestrated attacks on the 
Ogoni border of other states as a way to incite ethnic tension.  
An additional factor contributing to the increase in violence was increased 
militarization of the Delta region by Shell itself. First, Shell was responsible for employing 
the Nigerian police specifically to act as paramilitaries tasked with guarding local 
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refineries. According to Osaghae’s 1995 report, the members of this “supernumerary” force 
reported being told to incite violence between various groups as well as harass 
protestors.193 Additionally, in spite of Shell’s claims otherwise, it has been shown that, as 
late as 1995, the oil company was negotiating the sale of arms to the Nigerian police.194  
Ken Saro-Wiwa’s life and the early days of the MOSOP movement came to an end 
in 1994 when he was executed along with eight other leaders who would become known 
as the “Ogoni Nine.” Each of the Ogoni Nine were found guilty of murder of four other 
Ogoni leaders. The trial itself was not a fair and equal process. Some issues included the 
appointment of a court after the government already announced a guilty ruling and that one 
of the judges was an active Lieutenant Colonel in the Nigerian military. Finally, this case 
was happening at the same time as another case involving Ogoni protestors, and evidence 
produced for that trial was also used in the trial of the Ogoni Nine.195 Their deaths were 
met with international outrage and diplomatic condemnation including banning Nigeria 
from the Commonwealth of Nations and the retraction of several foreign diplomats.196 
Assessing the impact of environmental causes on the Ogoni uprising, one can see 
that they played a large part in establishing the movement. Ken Saro-Wiwa’s rhetoric and 
the Ogoni Bill of Rights are evidence of this. Together, Shell and the Nigerian government 
cooperated together and exploited the Delta for its resources while neglecting the rights of 
its residents. The movement was precipitated by strong state and ethnic identity, perceived 
ecological injustice, and the leadership qualities of Ogoni elites who were successful in 
mobilizing a protest. Once the protest began, the government and Shell increased tensions 
by failing to deal appropriately with the issue and instead worked to incite ethnic tension. 
Coordinated attacks, militarized oil companies, and limited power of the local government 
served to prolong the fighting and make it more violent. These findings provide support to 
the hypothesis two and four. Disrupted livelihoods played a key role in generating public 
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discontent. Additionally, the government did not have adequate institutional capacity to 
deal with the resultant occupational dislocation associated with oil pollution. Moreover, 
there were deliberate efforts by the federal government to increase violence. This speaks 
to the vital role of institutions in mitigating and adapting to environmental stress. 
Speaking to hypotheses one and three, there was limited supporting evidence that  
simple scarcity or migration were causing conflict. It is possible that because the pollution 
was so geographically concentrated, migration out of the Delta region would help alleviate 
conflict. Furthermore, local grievances are not targeted at water scarcity per se, but rather 
how the government allowed Shell and others to exploit the region’s land. 
G. CURRENT EVENTS: 
Like the mythological hydra, the Nigerian government’s attempts to cut off the head 
of the Ogoni oil insurrection only sprouted others to take its place. The newer, more violent 
iteration of oil protestors was the group named the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND). They were dedicated to disrupting the oil business in the Delta, 
specifying a target of a 30% reduction in oil output.197 Beginning in the mid-2000s, MEND 
was very successful in these efforts. On January 11, 2006, the group attacked an offshore 
oil vessel. Then, on 18 February of the same year, they succeeded in stopping production 
by 20% in a single attack when they destroyed the Forcados crude loading platform.198 
MEND’s actions were more violent than those of MOSOP and include, as Watts writes, 
“car bombings, brazen attacks on government and military buildings, massive disruption 
of oil installations…and the audacious kidnapping of workers.”199 MEND succeeded in 
reaching its goal of a reduction of 30% of oil production, prompting the Nigerian 
government to adopt a peace agreement in an effort to stop the rebels. In 2009 MEND 
militants were granted an unconditional pardon and received cash in exchange for stopping 
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violence and turning in their weapons.200 The Amnesty agreement worked until the 
government cut payments in 2014 in response to the collapse of oil prices, giving rise to 
new militant groups like the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). 
Although MEND is similar to MOSOP in targeting government corruption and 
illicit oil activities, they have different goals. Ken Saro-Wiwa was mostly focused on Ogoni 
rights, which extended to livelihood protections, environmental regulation, and respect 
from the government and oil companies. MEND’s goals are greedier and more self-serving. 
For example, the BBC reported in 2009 that General Godswill Tamuno, a MEND military 
leader, articulated their goal as total control of the Niger Delta’s oil wealth.201 Two of their 
other demands include receipt of 50% of revenues from oil pumped out of the Delta and a 
withdrawal of government troops from the Delta.202 Notably, in April 2006, MEND 
demanded Shell pay $1.5 billion in compensation for pollution in the Niger Delta. There is 
still an environmental side to MEND; however, unlike MOSOP it does not play as central 
a role. Rather, new militant groups in the Delta seem to be more motivated by gaining 
control of oil resources or revenue.  
The nature of MEND’s decentralized leadership structure is both a blessing and a 
curse. While it does not have any clear central target for the government to focus on, the 
group is likewise fragmented on its specific goals. While some members seem to want to 
become a legitimate political entity within Nigerian government, others are vying for 
regional political autonomy.203 In comparison to MOSOP, MEND is decentralized, more 
violent, and more focused on gaining control of oil resources. The fact that the amnesty 
agreement succeeded by giving cash and employing former militants is evidence that 
livelihood disruption does play a role in motivating Nigerians to join an insurgency. If 
improving militants’ economic condition led them to stop engaging in violent extremism 
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then we can infer that they were engaging in violence for economic reasons. This could be 
due to their personal grievances associated with livelihood disruption, the potential 
monetary benefit of joining an extremist group, or a combination of the two. If one were 
to engage the counterfactual, the Amnesty agreement not working would be evidence that 
the movements themselves were purely ideological or motivated by something other than 
economics. However, the Amnesty agreement was successful lending support to an 
economic theory for violence. Collier argues that a key factor in extremism is a low 
opportunity cost of engaging in violence. It is likely that access to oil revenues and 
livelihood disruption in the Delta created an environment that was more conducive to 
violent militancy. This provides support for the fourth hypothesis.  
H. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS: 
Based on this study of oil pollution, its impacts on livelihoods, and the cases of 
MOSOP and MEND there are two conclusions that can be drawn. First, oil operations in 
the Delta are having deleterious effects on the environment since they are responsible for 
spilling millions of gallons of oil and disrupting the ecosystem by destroying flora and 
fauna. Local Nigerians were and are very dependent on the environment for traditional 
livelihoods. Oil pollution, through its impact on the environment, disrupted these 
livelihoods which consequently eroded the social fabric of Delta societies. 
Secondly, livelihood disruption caused by environmental destruction played a key 
role in uniting the Ogoni people and mobilizing them to action. However, actions taken by 
the government such as intentionally killing Ogonis in ethnically sensitive areas made the 
conflict more violent. It is possible that if the government had given the Ogoni people 
greater political rights and helped clean up the oil pollution the issue it would have been 
sufficient to end the movement. The demands outlined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights were not 
unreasonable and Ken Saro-Wiwa himself was a rational actor bound by personal 
convictions to peacefully protest. Moreover, this would have set a precedent of engaging 
with the people rather meeting protest with force. Unfortunately, this was not the approach 
adopted by Nigerian leadership. Environmental issues, along with grievances against Shell 
and the government, united the Ogonis. Then, external factors made the protest movement 
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violent. These findings provide support to hypothesis three because actions taken by the 
federal government were the catalyzing factor for violence, which speaks to the power of 
state institutions. 
The motivations of MEND are harder to identify and, therefore, it is difficult to 
conclude to what extent livelihood instability has contributed to violence. Statements from 
the group indicate that they are driven by resource control, as opposed to MOSOP’s social 
and environmental justice roots. This being said, drawing upon Collier’s study of 
opportunity costs and violence, it is likely that the presence of oil in an environment where 
livelihoods have been disrupted would lower the opportunity cost of joining that group. 
Even if it is not articulated by the group itself, it is likely that individuals are joining MEND 
out of the economic reality that joining will grant new militants a financial boost. More 
research into livelihoods and the role it plays in the modern Delta insurgencies such as 









This thesis examined the question, how does water scarcity affect armed conflict in 
Nigeria? It began with an overview of water security as an issue and the main bodies of 
thought that exist within the field. My literature review identified four ways water scarcity 
may encourage armed conflict: direct conflict, insufficient institutions to cope with the 
scarcity, change in migration patterns, and disruption of livelihoods. My research differs 
from traditional water-conflict studies because it more precisely identifies each step along 
the causal pathway from scarcity to conflict. This approach is unique in the sense that it 
takes a step back from the magic formula approach of water-conflict, where previous 
studies have attempted to deduce exactly the right combination of variables to induce 
violence. My research begins with the understanding that each case of water-conflict is 
unique, then traces the steps and interaction of variables to see how conflict unfolds.  
In order to answer this question, I conducted an analysis of two cases of violence 
in Nigeria, in areas where there is also water scarcity. The first case of water security and 
violence is in the Lake Chad Basin, where lake recession and violent attacks by Boko 
Haram are occurring concomitantly. The second case was the Niger Delta, where oil 
pollution has degraded the natural environment. The region itself currently harbors some 
violent extremist groups, which were preceded by Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), which fought for the environmental rights of its people 
The methodology selected to analyze the two cases was process tracing. For each 
case, I began with a broad analysis of regional environmental concerns. I then followed the 
beginning of violence, parsing out resultant actions by citizens, the state, and any violent 
group. Similar to fitting the pieces together in a jigsaw puzzle, a more complete picture 
gradually emerged of what transpired to cause violence. This specific methodology was 
chosen because it allowed for a closer analysis of the changes that occur within a 
community, as water scarcity increases. Each step along the path, from the beginning of 
the scarcity to armed conflict, was identified to recreate the specific sequence of events 
which caused history to unfold as it did.  
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A. FINDINGS 
Overall, this thesis finds support for hypothesis two and four which posit that state 
institutions and livelihood disruption are responsible, in the cases analyzed, for inciting 
violence. There was insufficient supporting evidence for hypothesis one, simple scarcity 
as a direct cause of conflict. Speaking to hypothesis three, there were some select cases 
were migration did cause conflict. This being said, migration was closely related to 
livelihood disruption, so its role in the causal chain could be as an intermediate variable 
with livelihoods and institutions as the more direct cause. 
First, examining hypothesis one, scarcity alone did not cause violence. Based off 
of the evidence in the Niger Delta and around Lake Chad, water scarcity is insufficient to 
initiate violence. This is backed up by the fact that all cases of violence had additional 
conditions which increased tension, outside of environmental stressors. Lake Chad’s 
history provides evidence that simple scarcity was not enough to incite violence. For 
example, the basin experienced drought in the 1980s which was comparable to today and 
violent extremism did not spring forth. While there were some instances of communal 
conflict during the 1980s, an underlying condition for the present conflict is increased 
demand and lack of government response. Additionally, in the Niger Delta, MOSOP was 
dedicated to environmental justice. However, MOSOP itself was more broadly about the 
political autonomy of the Ogoni people, who had historically been marginalized by the 
Nigerian government. In this instance, environmental degradation was another example of 
how the Nigerian government was failing the Ogonis. 
Water scarcity acted as an amplifier for violence by enhancing inequality and the 
perception of inequality. For example, MOSOP had a strong environmental justice theme. 
Much of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s rhetoric played on the theme that oil money was enriching the 
lucky few while harming the impoverished majority. Moreover, the Ogoni people did not 
have the legal means to challenge those responsible for the environmental degradation 
enhancing their feelings of inequality. This same sentiment is evident in the Lake Chad 
Basin, which is home to the greatest levels of poverty and unemployment in Nigeria. In 
this case, water scarcity further takes away from the meager economic opportunities 
enhancing the perception of inequality. Boko Haram was also able to play on the religious 
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differences between the Muslim majority north and the Christian South. The evidence from 
the Niger Delta and Lake Chad Basin indicate that water scarcity itself was not the sole 
cause of armed conflict but worked with other factors to amplify existing tension which 
then lead to violence.  
Second, the Nigerian government did not do enough to help its people adapt to 
environmental stressors. A critical component in the transition from animosity to violence 
were the actions (or inaction) of the Nigerian government. For decades, oil extraction was 
left unregulated in the Delta, leading to ecological devastation. Then, when Delta residents 
chose to engage in passive resistance in response to their people’s exploitation, the 
Nigerian government took deliberate violent action. Furthermore, the Ogoni people did not 
have the legal means to challenge those responsible for the environmental degradation 
enhancing their feelings of inequality. There is evidence that the Nigerian military engaged 
in targeted attacks on specific ethnic tribes in order to divide the Delta states. Moreover, 
the government frequently sided with oil companies, refusing to hold them accountable for 
their negative environmental impact. By refusing to try and solve the actual issues and 
instead working against its people, actions by the Nigerian government increased tension 
and violent conflict. 
In the other case, lack of government action in the Lake Chad Basin has allowed 
for continued deterioration of socio-economic conditions and Boko Haram’s ongoing 
attacks. Although the government is more proactive today in combatting Boko Haram, the 
most at-risk communities were left to fend for themselves in the past. One solution that 
could improve conditions is breaching the wall between the northern and southern portions 
of the lake to ameliorate evaporation loss during drought. The government could also have 
educated fishermen and farmers in the region on sustainable practices so that they would 
not further degrade their increasingly scarce resources. Additionally, increased access to 
employment opportunities and business loans would have prevented some Nigerian youth 
from falling prey to Boko Haram’s economic enticements. In the Sahel, a lack of action 
was what reduced community resilience while in the Niger Delta the government worked 
to foment violence. These two examples speak to the importance of institutions in 
mitigating and adapting to environmental stressors.  
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Third, migration was more a result of conflict than a driving factor. Furthermore, 
migration is more of a mitigation and adaptation technique than something to cause 
conflict. In the instances when migration did cause conflict, such as between pastoralists 
in the Lake Chad Basin, it was due to increasing competition over resources and not due to 
migration itself. Around Lake Chad, the motivating factor behind migration were violent 
attacks by Boko Haram. In the Niger Delta, there is little to no mention of migration as a 
cause of conflict. Instead, Delta State residents are more likely to migrate as a response to 
environmental degradation. In this way, migration could be seen as a way to reduce the 
likelihood of conflict by reducing resource stress. 
The final finding is livelihood disruption was a cause of violence, and violence was 
a cause of livelihood disruption. Due to the structure of the Nigerian economy, the 
environmental impact of oil pollution and drought disrupted livelihoods, which provoked 
violent conflict. Additionally, the role of livelihoods is more cyclical than a causal chain, 
as conflict then further disrupts livelihoods. The economies of the Lake Chad Basin and 
the Niger Delta are centered on the land, agriculture, and fishing. The local populations in 
this region are negatively impacted by environmental changes due to their reliance on these 
industries for their traditional livelihoods. As livelihoods are disrupted, local Nigerians are 
forced to look for other means to support themselves. In the Lake Chad Basin this took the 
form of joining Boko Haram which promised some form of economic security. In the Niger 
Delta this takes the form of MEND and the NDA. The cyclical nature of livelihood 
disruption and violence is present in the relationship between Boko Haram and local 
communities. For example, traditional livelihoods are disrupted due to a combination of a 
rising population and drought. However, frequent attacks by Boko Haram create unstable 
conditions in the region which further erode traditional communities and livelihoods and 
feed into regional insecurity. This is important because it highlights the necessity of a 
complete and diverse reaction in order to find a lasting solution. Solving the economic 
woes without fighting Boko Haram will not solve the issue, just as eradicating Boko Haram 
would not restore peace due to the dire economic and environmental situation. In 
summation, water scarcity caused violence through its amplifying effects on existing and 
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underlying tension, specifically though the disruption of traditional livelihoods. Moreover, 
the role of government is essential in adapting and mitigating environmental threats. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis built upon existing literature and took a closer look at how water scarcity 
might be playing a role in increased rates of armed conflict. However, the work on this 
topic is far from over and there are other topics to be researched to better our understanding 
of water scarcity. First, what is the relationship between the environmental justice and 
conflict? One theme that emerged from my study was that environmental factors increased 
the perception of inequality. It would useful to see how different classes react to water 
scarcity. How does the capability to transition to other livelihoods physically relocate for 
better economic opportunities impact conflict? Similarly, how is ethnic marginalization 
impacted by water scarcity? The socioeconomic differences between ethnic groups would 
make some more susceptible to environmental strain than others. Is it possible that 
competing over resources would heighten existing tensions or even create new fault lines? 
Second, how do reactions to different forms of scarcity differ from one another? 
For example, the Niger Delta was an example of a degradation-induced scarcity related to 
oil pollution. This differed from the absolute scarcity in the Sahel. Research into the 
different reactions to degradation versus absolute scarcity would shed more light on human 
behavior in response to a water security threat. 
C. POLICY SOLUTIONS 
The role of institutions and their influence in mitigation and adaptation is one of 
the key findings of this thesis. This finding is significant due to its implications in how 
scarcity issues are confronted. Often, scarcity causing conflict is seen as a foregone 
conclusion. In an age of increasingly dire messages about the climate change rapture, it is 
easy to view conflict over scarce resources as an inevitability. This thesis makes the case 
for the power of institutions in mitigating and adapting to environmental stress. Humans 
are a remarkably adaptable species, which is why it is flawed to look at environmental 
stress and conflict as a static issue. Outlined next are some policy suggestions that the 
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Nigerian government could adopt to help the local populations in the Niger Delta and 
around the Lake Chad Basin. 
In the Niger Delta, the focus should be on equalizing wealth disparity and greater 
environmental protection. For starters, by giving local Nigerians a greater share of oil 
revenues the government could reduce the perception that oil is benefitting the few at the 
expense of the many. Dubai and Kuwait/Saudi Arabia, in spite of their authoritarian 
leadership, are two examples of how to keep its citizens happy while juggling vast oil 
wealth. The Nigerian government should follow these countries’ examples and pay its 
citizens a greater proportion of oil revenues. MEND’s rhetoric is indicative of the role that 
perceived economic grievances plays in the generation of conflict. Paying Nigerians 
directly would reduce economic grievances and thus, undercut a key pathway to violence. 
While I acknowledge that this would be difficult to institute due to Nigeria’s large 
population, the point remains that redistributing wealth would help reduce grievances as 
evidenced by the success of the amnesty program with the NDA. 
While paying Nigerians is a short-term solution, the long-term focus should be on 
diversifying the economy in order to reduce unemployment. The government could do this 
by investing in alternative energy. Not only would this employ a greater proportion of 
Nigerians, renewable energy sources also do not have the same negative externalities as 
fossil fuels. Not only would this shift be an environmentally conscious decision, but 
investing in renewable energy is wise economically as solar and wind gain greater share of 
the global energy market and as U.S. demand for foreign oil declines. The government 
must also hold Shell and other oil corporations accountable for their oil spills. These 
companies have the resources to pay damages to Delta state residents, restore the 
environment, or both.  
Some of these proposed policy solutions are more viable than others. The likelihood 
that Nigeria would transition its economy towards renewable energy if the oil market 
remains profitable. However, depending on how seriously politicians take the threat of 
climate change in the coming decades there is a chance that the global demand diminishes 
and countries, like Nigeria, which traditionally relied on oil, would have to find other ways 
of generating revenue. Diversifying the economy would become more viable should green 
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technology improve. The policy solution which is more immediately viable is 
redistribution of wealth. Though corruption still stands in the way, Nigeria has the potential 
to strengthen its democratic institutions. The success of the amnesty program, though brief, 
could help pave the way for a more comprehensive form of oil wealth redistribution in the 
future.  
The good news about Lake Chad is that there are tangible physical solutions to the 
water shortage, which would improve the lives of Sahelians. One solution is to breach the 
wall between the Northern and Southern portions of Lake Chad to reduce the negative 
impacts of drought. This action is more feasible than redirecting the Chari River and would 
not have the negative environmental implications of reducing fresh water supply in one 
area for greater supply in another. 
As the research showed, a significant portion of the water shortage is caused by 
poor agricultural practices. Therefore, teaching local communities about sustainable 
fishing and farming would help to reduce man made water losses. One way to reduce stress 
on the lake would be to educate people in different, more sustainable, growing techniques. 
Investment in drought-resistant crops would also reduce the deleterious effects of water 
shortage. As droughts are predicted to become more common in the future, it is important 
to have crops which can weather increasingly erratic growing conditions. 
When discussing countering Boko Haram, the Nigerian government should provide 
loans and financial support to Nigerian youth who wish to start businesses. One successful 
recruiting tool employed by Boko Haram is granting loans in return for someone’s service. 
Therefore, government aid for business would undercut Boko Haram through the 
elimination of the insurgent group’s financial incentives.  
In addition to providing loans, the government would be wise to invest in education. 
Studies show that greater education insulates a community against the pull of extremism 
because it allows for Nigerians to read and interpret holy texts themselves. Moreover, 
students are less likely to join an extremist group due to the economic opportunities 
afforded those who have an advanced degree.  
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Whether any of these solutions will be implemented depends on a variety of factors. 
As the drought continues, the opportunity cost of breaching the barrier within Lake Chad 
is lowered. This is also true for investment in drought resistant crops. Taking a closer look 
at investments in Nigerian youth, that will depend on the priorities of the government. 
However, the government is not solely responsible for instituting these solutions. There is 
a lot of room for NGOs, international organizations, and foreign governments to provide 
assistance. In Namibia, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency is already 















                                                 
204 Nathalie Mikhailova, "Drought-tolerant Crops to Contribute to Food Security in Namibia," 
International Atomic Energy Agency, March 2019. 
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